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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the impact of rules of origin (ROO) on the Malagasy textile and clothing 
industry. The ROO of two different preferential trading arrangements for developing countries, 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of the US and the Lomé/Cotonou agreement 
of the EU, are compared and related to Malagasy clothing exports and textile imports. The 
AGOA ROO are found to be more liberal than the ones in Lomé/Cotonou, especially when it 
comes to input sourcing. This study shows that strict ROO have a negative impact on Malagasy 
clothing exports. Clothing exports to the EU tend to grow slower, be less diversified and use less 
diversified inputs than exports to the US. Further, strict ROO are not found to increase vertical 
integration in the Malagasy textile and clothing industry. It can therefore be questioned whether 
using strict ROO as a tool for development policy in highly fragmentized sectors is effective. 
Lastly, the utilization rates for AGOA apparel are higher than the ones for Lomé/Cotonou 
apparel, reflecting the higher costs of exporting to the EU due to strict ROO. In conclusion, the 
limited input sourcing possibilities in the Lomé/Cotonou ROO can be said to have limited the 
expansion and diversification possibilities of the Malagasy textile and clothing industry.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
Rules of origin (ROO), which are an essential tool in international trade, determine the 
geographic origin of goods. The policy usages of ROO are diverse and include for example 
collecting trade statistics, applying import tariffs and safeguard measures, marking products as a 
service to consumers and imposing anti-dumping duties on unfairly traded goods. In addition, 
ROO are also used in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) to ensure that only the intended 
countries benefit from preferential treatment.1 Globalization has lately made production 
processes more fragmentized and increased the number of PTAs in the word rapidly.2 This has 
made origin marking harder and in turn highlighted the importance of ROO.  
 
The increasing importance of ROO has meant that more and more attention has been diverted 
towards them. Their supply-switching effects through inflexible input sourcing rules and 
administrative costs have been found to have a negative effect on trade.3 Questions about how 
trade enhancing a PTA with strict ROO really is have therefore been raised. Rules of origin also 
reduce the value of the tariff concessions in preferential trading arrangements for developing 
countries.4 This is problematic since it limits trade creation and development for poor countries 
and hence counteracts the whole purpose of these trading arrangements. Critical voices have 
even accused ROO of being a form of hidden protectionism.5 These accusations make it 
interesting to examine to what extent ROO can affect trade between countries in general and 
especially in the case of preferential trading arrangements for developing countries.  
 
Madagascar is one example of a developing country that is dependent on preferential trading 
arrangements. In order to reduce poverty, Madagascar has chosen an outward-looking 
development strategy where the Export Processing Zone (EPZ), Zone Franche, has played a 
crucial role. The Malagasy EPZ is one of few economic success stories in sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                 
1
 Ahmad (2007) p. 1 
2
 Ghoneim (2003), p. 598 
3
 Augier, Gasiorek and Lai-Tong (2005) p. 576 
4
 Brenton and Manchin  (2003) p. 767 
5
 Ahmad (2007) p. 1 
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and the reason behind the success is foremost a booming Textile and Clothing (T&C) sector. The 
sector’s expansion has been heavily reliant on the preferential access to both the European Union 
(EU) and the United States (US) granted to Madagascar for being a Least Developed Country 
(LDC). The ROO for clothing in the EU and the US preferential trading arrangements differ 
however. The EU rules have traditionally been quite strict while the US rules are known to be 
liberal, especially in terms of input sourcing. This fact makes Madagascar an excellent candidate 
for a case study on the impact of ROO on the T&C sector.  
 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of ROO on the T&C sector in Madagascar. 
The analysis focuses on final good exports and input imports to study the effects of liberal versus 
strict ROO and aims at answering the following: 
• Is it possible to see different trade patterns with the US and the EU when it comes to 
Malagasy clothing exports? If so, what are the differences and can they be related to 
ROO?  
• Further, can ROO be deemed to influence the choice of inputs in the Malagasy T&C 
industry? In what way? 
• To what extent is preferential access requested for Malagasy clothing exports to the US 
and to the EU? Is there a difference between the utilization rates for AGOA and 
Lomé/Cotonou apparel? 
 
1.2 Delimitations 
The paper is mainly based on data up until the year 2006. This means that the effects of this 
year’s political crisis in Madagascar and of the new Interim Economic Partnership Agreement 
(IEPA) between the EU and Madagascar are not covered by the data and hence not analyzed 
further. The IEPA is however mentioned in chapter four and chapter six includes a short update 
to recent events and their possible long-term effects for Madagascar.   
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1.3 Method and Material 
The study is based on economic theory in relation to economic integration and ROO. A 
comparative method is used to examine the differences, if any, between the trade effects of the 
US and EU ROO. The trade effects are analyzed by looking at export and import responses to 
the different preferential trading arrangements. In particular, the composition of final good 
exports to different markets is examined and related to the imports of input material. The data is 
collected from the United Nations Commodity Trade Data Base (UN COMTRADE), the EU’s 
Eurostat and the US Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA). The classification system used for 
data collection from UN COMTRADE is the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 
revision 2. This older system is used in order to get long time series on a reasonably 
disaggregated level. Utilization rates of the preferential trading arrangements and an examination 
of domestic input alternatives also serve to deepen the understanding of the effects of ROO.  
 
As a complement to the quantitative method described above, interviews were also conducted in 
Madagascar to get a better knowledge of the Malagasy textile and clothing sector. Interviews 
were held with representatives for private sector organizations, companies and the Delegation of 
the European Commission in Madagascar. It is important to note that this is only a case study 
and that the interviewed companies and organizations do not represent a scientific sample of the 
textile and clothing sector in Madagascar. The current political situation in Madagascar also 
forced me to shorten my stay in Antananarivo and made the number of visited companies quite 
small. 
 
All material, except interviews, in this paper is collected from articles published in scientific 
journals, reports from leading organizations/research centers like the World Bank or from 
electronic sources. Electronic sources are foremost taken from the sites of governments and such 
organizations just mentioned to get a high reliability. Data has been collected from different 
well-known sources, see above, and then compared to make sure that a just result is presented. 
 
1.4 Disposition 
Chapter two of this paper gives a quick background to the textile and clothing sector in 
Madagascar. Special attention is devoted to the EPZ’s importance for the sector’s development 
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and the effects of the phasing out of the Multi Fiber Agreement (MFA). The next chapter covers 
the economic theory in relation to ROO to give a theoretical background to the examined issues. 
Chapter four further describes the different preferential trading arrangements of the EU and the 
US, Lomé/Cotonou and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). This is followed by 
chapter five which presents the empirical material of the paper. This part is focused on the 
Malagasy export and import responses to Lomé/Cotonou and AGOA and these responses’ 
connection to ROO. Finally, chapter six summarizes the study’s findings and gives an update to 
the latest developments in the Malagasy textile and clothing sector. 
 
1.5 Previous Research 
A few studies have previously examined the impact of ROO on clothing exports from sub-
Saharan Africa. The entry into force of AGOA triggered several comparative studies on the 
effects of the EU and US preferential trading arrangements for LDCs. Most of the studies 
mentioned below looked at sub-Saharan Africa as a group and Madagascar was included in a 
majority of the samples. None of the studies is a case study of only Madagascar.  
 
That strict ROO have a negative effect on preferential market access is generally accepted and 
supported by findings by Cadot, Djiofack and De Melo.6 When it comes to African clothing 
products, it is foremost the limitations in fabric sourcing that reduces the effects of tariff 
concessions. Portugal-Perez has investigated this further and found that the relaxing of ROO by 
allowing producers to use fabric from anywhere in the world would increase African clothing 
exports by as much as 300 %. Rules of origin have also been found to restrict the possibilities of 
export diversification.7 De Melo and Portugal-Perez have showed that this restriction of 
diversification is expected to be in the 30-60% range.8 In addition, Ahmad has concluded that 
liberal ROO lead to increased sourcing from developing countries which means that strict ROO 
serve as impediments to South-South trade. The cost of this limited South-South trade as an 
effect of strict ROO is estimated to be USD 20 million annually.9 Rules of origin have also been 
showed to restrict developing countries when it comes to efficiency and producer networks. 
                                                 
6
 Cadot, Djiofack and De Melo (2008) p. 45 
7
 Portugal-Perez (2008) p. 21 
8
 De Melo and Portugal-Perez (2008) p. 19 
9
 Ahmad (2007) p. 34 
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Brenton and Ozden found that more liberal ROO would increase the African textile and clothing 
producers’ possibilities to create an efficient industry through enhanced integration into global 
and regional production networks.10 Finally, PricewaterhouseCoopers conducted a case study of 
the garment sector in Lesotho on behalf of the European Commission in relation to the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. The strict preferential ROO were found to be the 
core reason for the low volume of Southern African Development Community (SADC) clothing 
exports to the EU. Increased fabric sourcing flexibility through a single transformation rule, as 
AGOA ROO, or lower value-added thresholds were recommended.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Brenton and Ozden (2005) pp. 20, 22 
11
 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006) pp. 37, 72 
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2   Madagascar and Textiles 
 
 
 
Chapter two serves as a background chapter and aims to give a better understanding of the 
present situation in the Malagasy textile and clothing industry. The first part is a sketch of the 
economic background of the country, which is followed by an introduction of the Malagasy T&C 
sector. A special focus is diverted to the EPZ’s and the Multi Fiber Agreement’s importance for 
Malagasy clothing exports. 
 
2.1 Madagascar’s Economic Background 
In the first years of independence from the French colonial rule in the 1960s, Madagascar was 
one of the better-off countries in sub-Saharan Africa when it came to income and living 
standards.  This head-start was later lost due to decades of economic mismanagement during 
which per capita income declined, from USD 473 in 1970 to USD 290 in 2005.12 In the 1980s, 
the government started to implement reforms supported by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, in an attempt to get the country’s economic situation back on track. 
Import substitution was abandoned in favor of a more outward-looking development strategy and 
the allocation of public resources was improved.13 In the mid 1990s, the economic effects of the 
reforms finally started to materialize in terms of higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
and increased exports. So far the economic improvements have however only reached a few 
geographical areas due to inadequate redistribution policies.14 Madagascar is today one of the 
poorest countries in the world, and more than two thirds of the population live below the poverty 
line of USD 1 a day. The country has a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.533 which ranks 
the country as number 143rd out of 177 countries. The ranking places Madagascar as a country of 
medium human development, surrounded by countries like Nepal and Cameroon.15   
 
                                                 
12http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/MADAGASCAREXTN/0,,menuP
K:356362~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:356352,00.html   
13
 Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2004) p. 5 
14
 AfDB/OECD (2005) p. 279 
15
 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
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Figure 2.1 shows the annual GDP growth from 1990 to 2006. The overall positive picture is only 
disrupted by the negative growth rates of 1991 and 2002. That economic progress was put to a 
halt these years is explained by severe political instability. The big drop in the growth rate from 
2003 to 2004 is partly explained by the two violent cyclones that hit Madagascar in the 
beginning of 2004.16 Cyclones are a recurrent problem every rain season and often have severe 
consequences for the already poor Malagasy population. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Madagascar’s annual GDP growth in % 1990-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WDI Online 
 
2.2 The Textile and Clothing Sector 
The labor-intensive textile and clothing sector is a key sector for many developing countries. It is 
a sector, possibly the only successful one, where poor countries have been able to diversify and 
increase exports. This has been possible through exploitation of developing countries’ 
comparative advantage in low-cost labor. Further characteristics that make the T&C sector 
suitable for developing countries are low start-up investments, simple technology, a demand for 
low-skilled labor and limited importance of scale economies. That many LDCs in sub-Saharan 
Africa have preferential access to the EU and US markets has provided an additional incentive 
for developing T&C production in this area of the world.17  
 
Madagascar’s T&C industry is one of the fastest expanding in sub-Saharan Africa.18 The sector 
has gone through a period of impressive growth since the government’s more liberal economic 
                                                 
16
 AfDB/OECD (2005) p. 280 
17
 Brenton and Ozden (2005) p. 4 
18
 Nicita (2006) p. 5 
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policies were introduced in the late 1980s. The sector’s expansion has been especially positive 
during the last 15 years after the creation of the EPZ. In 1990, the number of garment producing 
firms was only 10.19 In 2007, this number had increased to 120. By then the Malagasy garment 
manufacturers employed 120 000 people, making the T&C sector supply over 30% of formal 
jobs in the economy.20 The textile and clothing sector’s focus on export has made clothing the 
dominant export good today, as can be seen in Table 2.1 below.   
 
Table 2.1 - Top 5 exported products in 200621 
 
 
USD million  % of total export 
1. Articles of apparel and clothing accessories  583 49,9 
2. Fish, crustacean and molluscs, and preparations thereof  218 18,6 
3. Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof  133 11,4 
4. Vegetables and fruit  40 3,4 
5. Miscellaneous manufactured articles, nes  23 1,9 
Other commodities  172 14,7 
Total 1169  100 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Textile and clothing exports as a share of total export22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE 
 
Further, Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of textile and clothing exports as shares of total export. 
From having had a negligent share of exports in the beginning of the 1990s, clothing alone now 
                                                 
19
 http://www.mefb.gov.mg/don_stat/don_sec/t12_nbzfis.pdf  
20
 Global Development Solutions (2007) p. 21 
21
 The products are classified according to SITC Rev. 2 where, Articles of apparel and clothing accessories have 
number 84, Fish, crustacean and molluscs, and preparation  thereof number 3, Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices & 
manufacs. thereof number 7, Vegetables and fruit number 5 and Miscellaneous manufactured articles, nes number 
89. 
22
 Exports are mirror exports. 
% 
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accounts for 50% of total exports. Textile has on the other hand had a rather stagnant 
development and has therefore not contributed to the sector’s expansion. In addition, the Figure 
shows that exports of clothing were hit hard by the political crisis in 2001-2002 but also that the 
sector recovered quickly and now exports more than before the crisis year of 2002. Finally, it 
seems like the fast expansion pace of clothing exports has experienced a slowdown since 2005 
which could be explained by the phasing out of the Multi Fiber Agreement, see section 2.2.2 for 
more information. 
 
The main destinations for Malagasy textile and clothing exports are the EU and the US. Europe, 
and in particular France, has traditionally been the most important trading partner for 
Madagascar. The entry into force of AGOA in 2000 has however changed the picture and the US 
is now also a major export destination. In the year 2006, the EU and the US received 52% and 
43%, respectively, of Madagascar’s total T&C exports. The export to the US has showed a 
slowdown the last few years, while the export to the EU on the other hand has been increasing 
slightly.23 Most of the clothing exports go to specialized retailer chains, supermarkets and mail 
order firms like the GAP, Carrefour and La Redoute.24  
 
2.2.1 Export Processing Zone 
The Export Processing Zone, or Zone Franche, was introduced in 1990 as a part of the export-led 
growth strategy under the structural adjustment program of the IMF and the World Bank. Law 
91.020, passed a year later in 1991, defines the rules for the free-zone companies.25 The main 
eligibility requirement for EPZ participation is export orientation. Companies must export at 
least 95% of their production or provide services and/or inputs to EPZ exporters. In addition, 
employment opportunities must be created and adequate environmental safeguards must be 
provided. Companies should also “strive to achieve significant technical know-how and 
technological transfer”.26  
 
The rewards for meeting the requirements are found in several tax breaks and special regulations 
concerning foreign ownership. EPZ companies are exempt from all duties and taxes on both 
                                                 
23
 COMTRADE and author’s calculations 
24
 Limantour (2006) p. 12 
25
 Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2004) p. 5 
26
 Cadot and  Nasir (2001) p. 6 
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exports and imports. However, in order to hinder firms supplying the local market from setting 
up an EPZ company, a Value Added Tax (VAT) on imported inputs was introduced in 1997. 
This VAT can later be refunded if the company shows a proof of export of the final good for 
which the input was imported. There is also a total exemption from profit tax the first 2 years for 
labor-intensive farming and fishing companies, and the first 4 years for industrial and service 
companies (i.e. T&C companies). After the first grace period, companies pay a fixed 10% in 
profit tax which is substantially lower than the normal 35% for non-EPZ companies. Moreover, 
companies are given a profit tax reduction equal to 75% of the cost of new investment. Important 
is also the special access to foreign currency and the total freedom for capital transfers for all 
EPZ companies.27 A 100% foreign ownership is further allowed as well as free repatriation of 
profits after payment of taxes. Since foreigners could not get property rights to land at the time 
of the passing of the EPZ law, foreign companies were granted 99 year leases for investment in 
land.28 
 
Thanks to the EPZ, Madagascar has experienced an export boom from the mid-1990s and has 
become the only successful African new exporter of manufactures, in addition to Lesotho, during 
the last decade. The free-zone has hence helped Madagascar to move from a dependency on 
agricultural products, mainly vanilla and coffee, to a more diversified economy. The 
manufactures produced mainly belong to the T&C sector. In 2001 Madagascar became the 
number two African clothing exporter in Sub-Saharan Africa after Mauritius.29 The same year 
the sector accounted for around 90% of total EPZ output in Antananarivo and Antsirabe, where 
the majority of EPZ companies are located.30 The T&C sector is still in total dominance of the 
EPZ today and accounts for more than 50% of all companies in the Zone.31  
 
The expansion of the EPZ was from the start driven by French investors who were attracted by 
the many French-speakers among the Malagasy population and by an already large French 
community.32 Investors became more diverse in time among which Mauritian companies have 
been especially important for the T&C boom. Mauritius is a country that a few years previous to 
                                                 
27
 Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2005) p.787 
28
 Cadot and Nasir (2001) p. 6 
29
 Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2007) p.5 
30
 Cadot and Nasir (2001) p. 6 
31
 http://www.gefp.com/statistiques.php?id=secteurs   
32
 Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2005) p.787 
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Madagascar experienced a similar development of their own textile industry. When wages rose 
in Mauritius and a US quota restriction on Mauritian imports was introduced, Mauritian 
investors looked for a suitable place to relocate. Important reasons why Mauritian investors 
chose Madagascar were the proximity to Mauritius, the high productivity of Malagasy workers 
compared to other Sub-Saharan countries, the French-speaking population, no quota restrictions 
and the low labor cost. It can be mentioned that the average monthly salary for a machine 
operator in Madagascar is less than one-third of that in Mauritius. However, managers have 
stated that Madagascar would not have been interesting without the implementation of the EPZ 
initiative despite the just mentioned advantages.33 A third phase of investment inflow came from 
Asia in the late 1990s in relation to the entry into force of AGOA in 2000. Production abroad 
was a way to circumvent the textile quotas faced by Asian companies. The choice of Madagascar 
was again motivated by the EPZ, low labor costs and by preferential access to both the EU and 
the US.34 The most common nationalities among EPZ owners in 2008 were French (29%), 
followed by Malagasy (20%), Mauritian (16%) and Chinese (12%).35  
 
In sum, the success of the Malagasy textile and clothing sector has been based on a combination 
of factors: low labor costs and a relatively high productivity have given unit production costs 
among the lowest in the world, preferential access to the US and EU markets has created a 
possibility for foreign investors to circumvent their own restricted access to the large markets, a 
French-speaking population has simplified potential communication difficulties and the EPZ has 
created the essential incentive to attract the foreign firms.  
 
2.2.2 The Multi Fiber Agreement  
Textiles and clothing have traditionally been a heavily protected sector both in the US and in 
Europe. The competition from developing countries using their comparative advantage in low-
cost labor was considered to threaten jobs in the labor-intensive T&C sector. Already in the 
1950’s, Asian low-cost countries agreed to introduce voluntary export restraints for cotton 
textiles to the US.  In 1962 the Long Term Agreement Regarding International Trade in Cotton 
Textiles (LTA) entered into force, and was later renegotiated and replaced by the MFA in 1974. 
                                                 
33
 Cadot and Nasir (2001) p. 7 
34
 Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2005) p.787 
35
 http://www.gefp.com/statistiques.php?id=nationalites_proprietaires     
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The agreement extended trade restrictions to wool and man-made fibers in addition to cotton. 
The MFA aimed at avoiding market disruptions when new markets opened up to trade which 
meant that the agreement was supposed to be temporary during an adjustment phase. There was 
however no clear definition of what constituted a “market disruption”. Consequently, the MFA 
came to comprise most developing country textile exports to the EU and the US. A system of 
bilateral quota agreements was set up that violated the principles of the multilateral trading 
system in several ways: it used quantitative restrictions instead of tariffs, it violated the most 
favored nation principle, it discriminated against developing countries and it was non-
transparent. The MFA finally expired in 1994 but was followed by the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing (ATC) the purpose of which was to serve as a transitory regime between the MFA 
and the complete integration of T&C into the multilateral trading system. The ATC 
progressively phased out the quotas during a period of ten years. From 1 January 2005, T&C 
have been subject to the general rules in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
after 40 years of restricted trade.36  
 
The phasing out of the quotas has brought about changes for Malagasy T&C producers. It has 
been shown that there is a strong correlation between the success of export processing zones and 
the MFA because the foreign direct investments in the zones have been a way to circumvent the 
quotas. It was expected that Asia, and especially China, would be the main beneficiary of the 
phasing out of the quotas. This has also turned out to be true. Even if Madagascar as a LDC still 
benefits from preferential access to EU and the US, the main incentive for Asian investors, 
circumventing the quota, is no longer there.37 This means that less investment from Asia is 
expected in the following years. It is also hard for Madagascar to compete with the high 
productivity of Asian workers. The increased international competition has already been noticed 
in Madagascar. The expansion of the Zone Franche and T&C exports has come to a halt since 
2005, see Figure 2.2. This development is far from unique; T&C producers in Africa have 
suffered from a decline or stagnation of exports in general after the MFA phase out. Of the major 
African T&C exporters (Mauritius, Madagascar, Lesotho and Kenya), Madagascar is still the 
country that has had the most positive development since 2003.38  See Table A.1 in Appendix for 
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a closer look at the development of African and Asian T&C exports after the phasing out of the 
MFA quotas. 
 
Investments did decline after 2005 in Madagascar and some Chinese owned clothing companies 
closed down.39 Many investors have however come back the last two years after disappointments 
with Asian quality.40 Nonetheless, Madagascar will never be able to compete with the low costs 
and weak environmental protection of Asia (foremost China and Bangladesh) when it comes to 
basic apparel production in the long run. Madagascar is therefore now trying to specialize in 
more technical products with higher value-added like embroidery. Designer brands with haute 
couture lines have for example taken an interest in Madagascar lately and this market is deemed 
to have a great potential if exploited correctly.41 The new direction of the industry can possibly 
explain why Madagascar has had the most positive development of the major African T&C 
exports since 2003. 
 
Lastly, the increased competition from Asia has also affected wages and labor standards in the 
EPZ. From having been a driving force for better working conditions in Madagascar, the EPZ 
has since 2005 lowered wages, labor standards and non-wage benefits. Working hours have 
gotten longer, company medical services, paid holidays, etc. which used to be much higher than 
in the private formal sector have now been substantially reduced. Wages are nonetheless still 
higher on average than in the informal sector, which is the main alternative for the low-skilled 
mainly female labor force of the Zone Franche.42  
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3 The Economics of Rules of Origin 
 
 
 
This chapter will begin with an introduction to and a definition of ROO. What are the different 
types and how is origin determined? Second, the effects of ROO are analysed and the critique 
that ROO are a protectionist tool is met. Special attention will be diverted to ROO and 
preferential trading arrangements for developing countries. 
 
3.1 Background to Rules of Origin 
Two types of ROO exist, non-preferential and preferential. Non-preferential ROO are simply 
used to determine where a product is produced. They are a way to separate domestic from 
foreign products so that for example safeguard measures and origin marking can be used. 
Preferential ROO, on the other hand, are used in a PTA to establish if products exported from 
one member to another qualifies for preferential treatment in the form of better market access.43 
The better market access usually comes in the form of a lower customs tariff, or in the case of a 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA), a tariff-free entry. The rest of the paper will focus on the role of 
preferential ROO in FTAs. 
 
The usage of preferential ROO in a FTA is justified by the risk of trade deflection. Trade 
deflection is a form of fiscal fraud and occurs when products from non-members are shipped 
through a transit country, a FTA-member with a low tariff, to a member country with a higher 
tariff.44 This trade deflection is possible since the FTA practises free trade between members but 
it has no common external tariff like a customs union has. An example of trade deflection would 
be if country A and country B are members of the same FTA and practise free trade between 
each other. Country B can then ship its products tariff free to country A and vice versa. Country 
C is on the other hand not a member of the FTA. Therefore C has to pay tariffs when exporting 
to both A and B. For argument’s sake, we can say that country A has a 10% tariff on all imports 
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from non-FTA members and country B only a 2% tariff. In that case, country C could 
theoretically ship its goods to country B, pay the 2% tariff and then re-export to country A tariff-
free. In this way, the higher tariff in country A is avoided.   
 
Due to the fact that the production process often is fragmentized and conducted in several 
different countries it has gotten harder to determine a product’s origin. As a consequence, the 
preferential ROO have become rather complicated. There are today different methods of 
determining origin of a product. There are two central criteria, recognized by the Kyoto 
Convention, to determine origin of a product: wholly obtained or produced and substantial 
transformation.45 The wholly obtained or produced criterion is uncontroversial and means that 
the country where the product has been entirely grown/harvested/extracted from the soil or 
produced using only material that has been domestically grown/harvested/extracted from the soil 
is the origin country. Simply put, no second-country components or material is allowed in the 
production process.46 
 
The substantial transformation criterion is more difficult and subjective. There are three main 
ways to determine if the product has gone through substantial transformation and different tests, 
sometimes a combination of tests is necessary to determine origin. The first possible test is a 
change in tariff classification according to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule between the input 
and the exported good. This can be more or less strict depending on how extensive the change 
must be. The change in tariff classification rule can demand that the product alter its chapter (2-
digit level), heading (4-digit level), sub-heading (6-digit level) or item (8-10-digit level). The 
change on chapter level is the strictest of these versions. The second test is value content which 
means that a certain percentage of value must have been added to the product to get origin status. 
This criterion can take three different forms: a) import content test: imported inputs are not 
allowed to exceed a certain percentage of the final good’s value; b) domestic content test: a 
minimum percentage of local value must be added in the last country where the product was 
processed; c) value of parts test: originating parts must account for a certain percentage of the 
final good’s value.47 The exact percentage differs between trade agreements and products but for 
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the import content test the percentage is usually around 40%.48 The third test is a specific process 
rule which requires the product to undergo (positive test) or not undergo (negative test) a certain 
manufacturing process in the originating country.49 
 
There are advantages and disadvantages with all three tests. The change in tariff classification 
test has the advantage of being relatively simple, easy to apply and it could be used uniformly 
across countries. Difficulties, on the other hand, are applying a commodity classification 
designed for several purposes and the habit of having lists of exceptions when it comes to this 
rule. The value content test is potentially quite costly since it requires examination of production 
costs, decisions on how to value inputs and what inputs should be used. The advantage of the 
specific process rule test is that it can be adjusted to any special case. However, it is very 
difficult to construct technical tests for every product. It is also hard to verify information in 
order to determine which process actually took place in third countries and therefore it can be 
easy to manipulate the facts.50 
 
Finally, there exist some complementary rules, used in combination with one or several of the 
above tests, to make ROO less restrictive. Cumulation rules allow producers to use inputs from 
certain countries without losing the preferential status given to them in a FTA. This cumulation 
can be bilateral, diagonal or full. Bilateral cumulation is the most common form and operates 
between two FTA partners. Partner A can use inputs originating from the partner B as if they 
were A’s own, and vice versa, without affecting the final good’s origin status. Diagonal 
cumulation means that beneficiary countries that are members of the same preference program 
can use inputs originating from each other and still be granted origin status for the final product. 
Full cumulation is the least restrictive form and extends diagonal cumulation. Here, countries 
tied together by the same preferential origin rules can use goods produced in any part of the area, 
even if they were not originating products. All processing done in the preference area is regarded 
as if it had taken place in the final processing country.51  
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Two other complementary rules exist. First, the de minimis rule that accepts a certain maximum 
percentage of non-originating inputs in the production without affecting origin. Finally, there is 
the absorption principle which means that products which have gained origin status are allowed 
to be considered originating when used as inputs in subsequent production.52 
 
3.2 Rules of Origin - a protectionist tool? 
Rules of origin can have an impact on trade and investment flows and how well a FTA with 
ROO promotes trade liberalization has been questioned. ROO raise domestic production and 
administrative costs and this in turn affects trade. Production costs are increased due to supply-
switching effects and the technical criteria imposed by the ROO regime. The supply-switching 
leads to trade diversion and the rise in production costs can also decrease final goods production. 
Administrative costs are increased because producers have to get the origin certification and 
because the import country’s customs has to verify the origin. The administrative costs work as a 
form of transaction cost and are likely to reduce bilateral trade creation.53 An attempt to compare 
costs between different ROO has been done by Carrère and de Melo. They found that a change 
in tariff heading is the least costly to comply with, followed by value content rules and finally, a 
technical requirement is found to be the most costly.54 ROO also have an investment effect. In 
the long run, ROO can create investment diversion when extra-FTA producers choose to locate 
plants inside the FTA in order to satisfy the ROO and benefit from preferential treatment.55 
 
3.2.1 Rules of Origin as transaction costs 
The complexity of the origin rules can act as a blocker of the potential trade creating effects of 
the tariff concessions granted in a FTA. Trade creation is the phenomenon when domestic 
production is replaced by cheaper imports, due to relative price changes when free trade is 
introduced, from a more efficient FTA-partner. Different certification mechanisms impose costs 
on both firms and governments. These costs are often far from small and increase even more 
when countries are members in several FTAs, which is a common phenomenon. The 
administrative burden offsets the tariff liberalization and leads to underutilization of preferences. 
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Firms can simply avoid all the ROO administrative costs if they choose to act as Rest of the 
World (ROW) producers and instead pay the non-preferential tariff. As long as this tariff is 
reasonably low, which it often is between developed countries, the distortion of trade between 
FTA-partners is limited but trade creation will, of course, still be affected.56 In the case of a high 
non-preferential tariff, the effect on trade creation is larger and producers can then choose to use 
inputs from the ROW and only produce for the home market and the ROW instead of producing 
for the FTA partner.  
 
3.2.2 Increased production costs through supply-switching 
According to classic Vinerian analysis with trade creation and trade diversion, FTAs will lead to 
some supply-switching, with FTA-suppliers as the beneficiaries, when preferential tariffs change 
the relative price of imports. Partner country imports become relatively cheaper than before and 
third country imports become relatively more expensive, which induces a natural supply-
switching in favour of partner firms despite more efficient third country producers. Supply-
switching to a FTA-supplier from a more efficient third country producer is called trade 
diversion and creates economic inefficiencies. This classical analysis does not take ROO into 
account which is unfortunate since ROO can aggravate the supply-switching effects of FTAs.  
 
The impact of the preferential tariff aside, ROO distort trade patterns both between members of 
the FTA and between members and the rest of the world. In order to meet the ROO, firms often 
have to change suppliers from extra-FTA to intra-FTA (to domestic suppliers in the case of no 
cumulation). This means that ROO create an extra element of trade diversion. In the ordinary 
trade diversion case described above, a country switches suppliers to a partner country because it 
would be cheaper when zero tariffs between partners are introduced. In the case of FTAs and 
ROO, producers would switch suppliers even if it meant more expensive inputs to comply with 
the ROO. This additional trade of inputs between members can easily be mistaken for evidence 
of trade creation which they are not. That ROO have a supply-switching effect can be used by 
protectionist governments or industry lobbies. A country can protect its own industries on a 
partner country’s market even if the partner country in question has zero tariffs to the rest of the 
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0 
world. A country with high cost producers can in this way export protection of its industries to 
member countries through restrictive ROO.57  
 
The effect of supply-switching because of restrictive ROO on production costs can be shown 
graphically according to a model developed by Kala Krishna.58 Figure 3.1 shows how costs rise 
when the choice of inputs is limited through a value content test with bilateral cumulation. The 
model contains two types of inputs, FTA-inputs (L) and third country inputs (K), that are used to 
produce the good in question under constant returns to scale. The curve in the figure depicts the 
unit isoquant which symbolises the number of goods produced. At a given price for L and K 
firms will choose the input mix at point Z, using L and K so that their ratio equals α. The height 
of the line AB represents the lowest unit costs attainable for that input mix. If binding ROO then 
are introduced which require L/K to be at least α’ > α, Z would no longer be a feasible option 
because only points below the ray from the origin with slope 1/α and above the isoquant would 
be possible. The unit costs are therefore now minimized at point X and represented by the height 
of line DE. The ROO have raised the production costs and distorted the input mix in favour of 
the FTA-inputs for any given level of output. It is also possible to see that as the ROO become 
more restrictive, as α rises and the ray from the origin swings down, unit cost will rise, shift out.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Value content ROO and Costs 
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3.2.3 Trade preferences for developing countries and ROO  
The LDCs have received preference treatment in the multilateral trading system since 1971. 
Preferences are granted in the form of reduced or zero tariff rates over the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) rates for selected products in order to increase LDCs’ export earnings, promote their 
industrialization and to accelerate their rates of economic growth. Several programs for trade 
preferences for developing countries have evolved in the world, presently there are 13 national 
preference schemes notified to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).59  
 
The motive for including ROO in preferential trading arrangements differs from the usual trade 
deflection justification. In the case of North-South integration it would namely be the preference 
granter that would benefit from trade deflection since tariffs in general are lower in developed 
than in developing countries.  Reasons why ROO are seen as necessary are hence found 
elsewhere. First, preference-granters do not want to extend the preferences involuntarily to non-
eligible producers or producers that only transform their goods superficially. Second, the ROO 
can be a way to control the process of preferential liberalization through a reduction of 
adjustment costs in the North. Third, the usage of ROO in preferential programs is sometimes 
described as a tool for development policy because ROO are believed to encourage vertical 
integration in developing countries. The demand to use domestic inputs is seen as a form of 
infant industry protection of local producers further down the value chain.60  
 
Vertical integration is however not an easy target in developing countries where light and labor 
intensive industry often is the only possible and credible industrialization option. It is therefore 
harder to create sustainable vertical integration since input industries can be more capital 
intensive than the final good production. If vertical integration takes place, the result risks being 
inefficient due to the protection effect of the ROO which means that the new input-supplying 
industries serve to institutionalize the trade deflection effect of regional integration.61 Certain 
sectors’ characteristics make it especially hard to make ROO lead to an increase of locally 
sourced inputs or vertical integration. This is for example true for the textile and clothing 
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industry where global dynamics require unregulated access to low cost materials to be 
competitive and where “buyer-driven value chain realities” dictate producer choices.62 
 
Restrictive ROO can lead to strong supply-switching effects that are more damaging in 
developing countries just because they often lack domestic suppliers of inputs and because it is 
hard to build up such an input industry. These effects can be shown in a sketch of the hub-and-
spoke system which exemplifies how both FTA-members and third countries are affected by 
ROO. A hub-and-spoke system evolves when one country forms bilateral FTAs with many other 
countries, for example when the EU creates a preferential trading arrangement for developing 
countries. The EU then becomes the “hub” of the system and the developing countries that are 
connected to the EU through bilateral FTAs are called “spokes”. Below, Figure 3.2 shows a hub-
and-spoke pattern. Bilateral FTAs, as mentioned above, tend to diminish trade between spokes 
because of two phenomena: the preferential tariffs the spokes grant firms in the hub but not firms 
in other spokes, and the ROO that lead to supply-switching towards domestic or partner firms in 
order to meet origin requirements. Exports from the ROW to the spokes also tend to be 
depressed because of the same reasons just mentioned. There is however no first-order effect on 
exports from spokes to the ROW.63 Diagonal or full cumulation can of course reduce the loss of 
exports between spokes.  
  
Figure 3.2 – Hub-and-spoke system 
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If a developing country takes part in a preferential trading arrangement and there are no domestic 
suppliers of inputs, the country will be forced to use expensive inputs from the hub instead of 
using the cheapest option on the world market in order to comply with the ROO. In this way it 
will be hard for the developing country to develop its industries and to compete on the world 
market since the products produced will be more expensive and more inefficient than otherwise 
would have been the case. It is also harder for a poor country with low labor costs to comply 
with high value-added requirements in the ROO relative to countries with higher labor costs.64 
Moreover, it happens that the ROO themselves are so strict for labor intensive products, which is 
what developing countries in general export, that it is difficult for spokes to gain origin status for 
this type of goods.65 This means that the value of the tariff concessions is greatly reduced for 
developing countries and that the preferential trading arrangements can be more protectionist 
than first thought.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Brenton (2006) p. 281 
65
 Brenton and Manchin  (2003) p. 767 
 29 
4     Preferential Trading Arrangements 
 
 
 
Chapter four presents the EU and the US preferential trading arrangements for LDCs with a 
focus on the ROO of the programs. Madagascar is eligible for preferential market access to both 
the EU and the US market, a fact that has largely contributed to the development of the 
Malagasy T&C sector. Since Madagascar is an African country, only preference programs 
concerning Africa will be covered below. 
 
4.1 EU Preferential Trading Arrangements 
4.1.1 Lomé and Cotonou  
Europe’s colonial history has led to a special cooperation between the EU and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The beginning of this cooperation dates back to the 
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, then with a 
particular focus on French-speaking African countries. The adhesion of the United Kingdom to 
the EEC in 1973 started a wider reaching cooperation program. In 1975 the first Lomé 
convention governing trade relations between the EEC and 46 ACP countries was signed in 
order to promote economic development. Several updates of the convention followed but the 
main focus of non-reciprocal trade preferences, mainly duty-free and quota-free access, for most 
ACP exports to the EU remained the same.66  
 
The Lomé convention was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 to prepare the EU-ACP 
collaboration for complete fulfilment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules since non-
reciprocal exclusive trade preferences violate the principle of non-discrimination in the GATT.67 
The old trade preference scheme remained in force until 1 January 2008 when EPAs replaced the 
trade chapters of the Cotonou Agreement. The EPAs entail a deeper cooperation with rights and 
obligations for both sides of the partnership, a partnership based on reciprocity.68 Each EPA is 
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negotiated separately between the EU and the country or groupings of countries in question 
which means that the degree of trade liberalization will differ between EPAs. ACP-countries that 
chose not to sign an EPA before the end of 2007 were offered the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
trade initiative instead, an arrangement known to be stricter in terms of market access than ACP-
regulation.69 An important note is that the EBA only was an option for the LDCs among the 
ACP-countries. There is no time limit for the EPAs while the Cotonou Agreement was 
concluded for a twenty-year period and is hence valid until 2020.70 
 
Madagascar signed an Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) as a part of the Eastern 
and Southern Africa (ESA) grouping in December 2007. The IEPA entered into force on January 
1 2008 and is limited in duration until the full EPA comes into force. This interim agreement was 
put in place in order to give more time for finalizing the EPA negotiations which broke down 
due to differences in market access offers.71 The IEPA gives Madagascar 100% free access to the 
EU market with a transition period for sugar and rice. In exchange Madagascar will 
progressively liberalize market access for about 80% of the country’s imports from the EU 
during an adjustment period of 15 years. This means that by 2022 80% of Malagasy imports 
from the EU will enter the country duty free. Madagascar has also chosen to exclude a range of 
sensitive agricultural and industry products from liberalization, for example fish, cereals and 
plastic.72 The EPA negotiations are hoped to be concluded before the end of this year but 
according to a representative for the European Commission’s Delegation to Madagascar this goal 
will probably not be met due to disagreements over levels of development assistance.73  
 
4.1.2 Rules of Origin for Textiles and Clothing 
The preferential market access granted to ACP-countries through the Lomé convention and the 
Cotonou Agreement was contingent on the fulfilment of certain product specific ROO. The EU 
ROO for the T&C sector are known to be quite strict. Clothing has to be manufactured from 
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wholly produced or qualifying yarn. The production from yarn further has to comply with the 
double transformation rule which means that two different production processes must take place 
in the beneficiary country. For clothing this implies that yarn must be woven into fabric which 
then, in turn, must be cut and made-up into clothing. Bilateral and full cumulation from African 
countries is allowed which gives that qualifying yarn must originate in the beneficiary country, 
the EU or any other African ACP-country. It is the full cumulation rules of the Cotonou 
Agreement that made most African countries also eligible for EBA continue to export under 
Cotonou when the EBA initiative was introduced in 2001. EBA only allows regional cumulation 
for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Central American Common 
Market (CACM), and the Andean Community. Hence, African countries are only allowed to use 
bilateral cumulation under EBA, meaning that inputs must originate in the beneficiary country or 
the EU in order not to lose origin status of the final product.74  Madagascar is one of the many 
countries that chose to continue to export under Cotonou even if the country is eligible for EBA. 
 
The IEPA entails substantial changes of the ROO for T&C compared to previous rules in Lomé 
and Cotonou. The EU has left the double transformation rule behind and has agreed that only 
single transformation is necessary to obtain origin status. This means that Madagascar as a 
signatory to an IEPA now is allowed to source fabrics from anywhere in the world, transform 
them and then export both quota and tariff free to the EU.75 The ROO for T&C of the final EPA 
will not differ from the ROO of the interim agreement.76 
 
4.2 US Preferential Trading Arrangement 
4.2.1 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act is part of the Trade and Development Act, a law 
signed by President Clinton in 2000.  The AGOA initiative provides quota- and duty-free access 
to the US market for 38 Sub-Saharan countries.77 The Act originally covered eight years, i.e. the 
period from 2000 to 2008, but was extended in 2004 until 2015. Products included for 
preferential market access are all goods previously eligible for the US GSP program as well as 
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an additional 1800 product tariff lines specially added for AGOA. Among the new products are 
for example apparel, footwear, wine, chemicals and steel.78  
 
Country eligibility for AGOA takes into account several requirements, including political and 
economic criteria. Market-based economies, rule of law, elimination of barriers to US trade and 
investment and a strategy for poverty reduction are examples of criteria that must be fulfilled. 
Countries that are not eligible at present are Zimbabwe and Sudan. Moreover, the Central 
African Republic and Eritrea were removed as AGOA beneficiaries in 2003 while Mauritania 
and Côte d’Ivoire have been suspended. Madagascar has been an AGOA beneficiary since the 
beginning of the program in October 2000.79 
 
However, AGOA eligibility does not imply the right to export clothing and certain textile 
products duty-free to the US. In order to do so countries must, in addition to AGOA eligibility, 
also comply with the “Wearing Apparel” provisions. To be qualified for these extra provisions, 
countries must implement a product visa system in compliance with the AGOA ROO that has 
been approved by US authorities. Presently, 29 of the 38 AGOA eligible countries have fulfilled 
the “Wearing Apparel” conditions. Madagascar has been one of these countries since March 
2001 and is thereby granted the right to export apparel to the US duty-free.80 
 
4.2.2 Rules of Origin for Textiles and Clothing 
If the “Wearing apparel” provisions are fulfilled, countries that want to export apparel duty-free 
to the US must also comply with the special set of ROO for T&C. Clothing made in qualifying 
countries from US fabric, yarn and/or thread are granted duty- and quota-free access to the US 
market with no further limitations. Clothing made from domestically produced fabric and yarn, 
or from fabric and yarn produced in other AGOA-beneficiaries has duty-free access to the US 
but is subject to a cap of 1.5% of total US apparel imports. The percentage was to increase 
progressively to 3.5% of total imports in 2008 and then remain unchanged at 3.5% until 2015. 
Amendments to AGOA have however been made that doubled the applicable percentages of this 
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cap which means that the quota presently is set to 7%.81 The quota has so far not hindered export 
from AGOA-beneficiaries. The quota fill rate reached about 60% in 2001-2002 but has after that 
been around 30-35% each year.82 
 
There are also additional rules concerning apparel that is mainly made from qualifying inputs. A 
garment otherwise eligible for AGOA preferential access shall not be disqualified due to the fact 
that the article “contains certain interlinings of foreign origin”. The value of these interlinings 
must nevertheless not exceed 25% of the cost of all components of the garment. Finally a de 
minimis rule says that apparel can always benefit from duty-free access if the total weight of 
foreign, i.e. not of US or AGOA-beneficiary origin, fibers or yarn is not more than 10% of the 
total weight of the article.83 
 
What separates AGOA from all other preferential trading agreements is the possibility for LDCs 
to benefit from special ROO. LDCs are allowed to used third country fabrics, not US or AGOA, 
and still be granted duty-free access to the US market. This means that inputs can be sourced 
from wherever in the world.84 The special provisions for LDCs were originally meant to expire 
in 2004 but have been extended two times, first until 2007 and now until 2012. All AGOA-
beneficiaries, except Gabon, Mauritius, the Seychelles and South Africa, have enjoyed LDC 
status from the start. Mauritius has however benefited from access to third country fabrics since 
October 2008 after legislative amendments to AGOA.85 
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5    Impact of AGOA and Lomé/Cotonou  
 
 
 
This chapter investigates the trade impacts of the US and EU preferential trading arrangements 
on the Malagasy textile and clothing industry. The analysis will compare Madagascar’s trade 
with the US to the country’s trade with the EU in order to assess the impact of ROO on trade 
patterns. In the first step of the analysis, export data is examined and related to AGOA and 
Lomé/Cotonou. The second step is devoted to import data since theory predicts that ROO can 
affect the choice of input goods. This will also give indications of the importance of the 3rd 
country fabric-rule for increasing investments and exports. The chapter ends with an evaluation 
of vertical integration and of the utilization of trade preferences.  
 
5.1 Response to AGOA 
The figure below shows clothing exports to the EU and the US from the creation of the export 
processing zone in 1990 and onwards. This picture gives the starting point of the analysis and 
shows the dramatic expansion of Malagasy clothing exports to its main markets, the EU and the 
US.  
 
Figure 5.1 - Clothing exports to the EU and the US  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: COMTRADE 
 
USD million 
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As Figure 5.1 shows, clothing exports to the US were basically non-existent until the late 1990s. 
Interestingly, exports started to increase already in 1998-1999, that is before the entry into force 
of AGOA in 2000. Clothing exports increased for example by as much as 136% between 1999 
and 2000. This anticipation effect can be a sign of the high expectations investors had of the US 
agreement.  In 2000-2001, after the entry into force of AGOA, clothing exports to the US 
continued to increase rapidly until the crisis year of 2002 when exports plummeted due to 
political instability. However, exports recovered very quickly and reached a new all time high 
already in 2003.  The following year, 2004, even surpassed the numbers of 2003 and is still 
today the peak year of Malagasy clothing exports to the US. Exports have namely slowed down, 
as Figure 5.1, shows after 2004. This can be related to the already mentioned end of export 
quotas for Asian countries in 2005. That exports to the US seem to have been affected more by 
the phasing out of export quotas than exports to the EU can in part be explained by the fact that 
the export boom to the US has been driven by Asian investors.86  The latest data from OTEXA 
show a slight increase in clothing exports to the US again in 2007 to USD 289 million, indicating 
that the negative trend might be stoppable.87  
 
These new numbers also support the already mentioned statement by a representative for a 
private sector organization in Antananarivo. It seems to be true that Asian companies, who 
mainly export to the US, left at first in 2005 after the MFA phase out but then many came back a 
few years later.88 Another factor that probably reduced the negative export trend to the US is the 
American imposition of safeguard quotas on textile and apparel imports from China in 
November 2005. These safeguard quotas did not expire until December 31 2008 so the real 
effects of the MFA phase out will not be felt until this year. What this will mean for the 
Malagasy T&C sector is yet too early to say but the US has already noticed a growth in imports 
from China of certain key clothing products of great importance for Africa.89 It is therefore safe 
to say that competition from Chinese producers is likely to get fiercer for the Malagasy T&C 
sector in the coming years. 
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Figure 5.2 - Exports of Clothing to the US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To further assess the impact of AGOA, clothing exports to the US have been broken down to a 3 
digit level in Figure 5.2. It is possible to see that the product group that has benefited the most 
from AGOA is Outwear, knitted or crocheted (845).  Yet, the importance of this product group 
has decreased after the MFA phase out. In 2006 it was instead Women’s, girls’ and infants’ 
outwear of textile fabrics, not knitted or crocheted (843) that was the main product group 
exported to the US. In general, knitted or crocheted products were more important before the 
MFA phase out than after. The last few years, products of textile fabrics that are not knitted or 
crocheted have surpassed knitted and crocheted products in export value. 
 
In order to get a general idea of what type of inputs are used in the different clothing products, a 
further look at the most exported clothing categories in 1998, 2003 and 2006 is necessary.  The 
year of 1998 is chosen because it shows the situation before the entry into force of AGOA. The 
year 2003 then gives an indication of the trade pattern in the middle of the expansion phase. It is  
important here to keep in mind that 2003 was the year after the crisis in 2002. The numbers for 
2003 are therefore smaller than otherwise would have been the case. Finally 2006 is the last year 
of available data and a year after the MFA phase out. 
 
USD million 
Source: COMTRADE 
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Table 5.1 - Most exported clothing categories to the US in USD million  
 
  
1998 2003 2006 
8439 Women's, girls' and infants' other outer garments of 
textile fabrics, not knitted or crocheted 
3.6 62.3 85.6 
 
of cotton 100% 97% 95% 
 
of man-made fibers 0% 1% 4% 
8423 Men's and boys' trousers, breeches and the like,  
not knitted or crocheted 
5.6 21.7 52.7 
 
of cotton 100% 98% 74% 
 
of other fibers 0% 0% 17% 
 
of man-made fibers 0% 2% 8% 
8451 Jerseys, pullovers, slipovers, cardigans, etc. knitted 
or crocheted 
5.4 72.2 49.1 
 
of cotton 53% 59% 67% 
 
of synthetic fibers 0% 13% 18% 
 
of wool or fine animal hair 47% n.a. n.a. 
8459 Other outer garments and clothing accessories, 
knitted or crocheted 
0.4 31.3 27.6 
 
of cotton 100% 62% 72% 
 
of synthetic fibers 0% 37% 28% 
8462  Undergarments, knitted or crocheted 1.6 12.7 26.4 
 
of cotton 100% 100% 100% 
Source: COMTRADE 
 
Table 5.1 is organized according to the most exported products in 2006. All three years have the 
same most exported products but the order between the products changes during the examined 
period.90 Men's and boys' trousers, breeches and the like, not knitted or crocheted (8423) was the 
most exported product in 1998, while Jerseys, pullovers, slipovers, cardigans, etc. knitted or 
crocheted (8451) was the most exported good to the US in 2003. This category was however not 
far behind the most exported one in 1998. In 2006, it is instead Women's, girls' and infants' other 
outer garments of textile fabrics, not knitted or crocheted (8439) that has taken over as the most 
exported good. The distance to the second most exported good is also larger than before.  
 
Certain trends can also be identified when it comes to the inputs used. Cotton is by far the most 
used input during the examined period even if cotton is less important in 2006 than in 1998. 
There is also a tendency to use more synthetic fibers and more other fibers in the 2000s in 
comparison to the late 1990s.91 Wool or fine animal hair is on the other hand less used in the end 
                                                 
90
 The only exception to this statement is category 8459 which was not one of the top five exported clothing 
products to the US in 1998. 
91
 Clothes made of synthetic fibers are also subject to a higher tariff than clothes made of cotton when entering the 
US. Since Madagascar can export tariff-free to the US it is more profitable to export clothes made of synthetic fibers 
than clothes made of cotton. Source: Interview GEFP 
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of the period and is no longer one of the most important inputs for products aimed at the US 
market.  
 
5.2 Exports to the EU 
Because the Lomé convention was in place before the creation of the export processing zone, 
that is to say before any large scale clothing production took place in Madagascar, it is harder to 
see a direct effect of the EU preferential trading agreement.  It is still possible to analyze the 
trade pattern to the EU in order to compare possible effects of different ROO.  
 
As both Figures 5.1 and 5.3 show, exports to the EU took off before the export boom to the US.  
This is not surprising given the preferential access to the EU market and the historically close 
ties to Europe, in particular France. As already mentioned, French investors were also the first to 
devote attention to the Malagasy export processing zone. Even if the clothing exports to Europe 
expanded relatively fast, the expansion pace must be deemed as slower than the one of exports to 
the US in the late 1990s. Further, signs of stagnation for exports to the EU are found already 
before the crisis year of 2002. Export values are basically the same from 1999 to 2001. The 
exports to the EU also recovered more slowly than those to the US after the crisis. The same 
export level as before the crisis year was not reached until 2006. On the other hand, exports to 
the EU do not seem to be affected to the same extent as the exports to the US by the end of 
export quotas for Asian countries. Instead, export volumes are still growing and the EU is 
therefore again the most important export market for Malagasy clothing goods with an export 
value of USD 304 million in 2006, see Figure 5.1.  
 
Among the managers interviewed there were diverging opinions about exporting to the EU. One 
manager, of a company that mainly exported to the EU, stated that exporting to the EU market 
felt more reliable just because European clients tend to react slower to demand changes than the 
American ones. To export to the US is therefore sometimes seen as riskier since those exports 
are more volatile. In this manager’s view, the slower expansion pace for EU exports was 
therefore not that problematic but instead a sign of trustworthy long-term business 
relationships.92 On the other hand, a manager whose company mainly exported to the US thought 
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it was difficult to export to the EU. It was believed to be easier to enter the US market than the 
European one, especially because Europeans tended to take slower decisions. At this company, 
the faster pace of American decision-making was appreciated and the American business culture 
was seen as more transparent.93  
 
Figure 5.3 - Exports of Clothing to the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: COMTRADE 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the development of clothing exports to the EU on a 3 digit level to further 
compare exports to the EU to those destined for the US. The most exported clothing product 
group to the EU from 1993 and onwards is Outerwear knitted or crocheted (845). The 
dominance of this product group is even greater than in the US case since it does not show a 
slowdown after 2004. It has in fact gotten even more important the last few years. This implies 
that exports to the EU do not show any decreased percentages of knitted or crocheted goods, as 
was the case for exports to the US. The expansion of exports of Outerwear knitted or crocheted 
(845) further means that non-knitted or crocheted products have become less important for the 
EU market. The difference between knitted and non-knitted products is interesting and consistent 
with the findings of Brenton and Ozden who found that ROO requirements are more costly for 
non-knitted than knitted products. This because the ROO for non-knitted items demand that both 
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the fabric and the yarn of which the fabric is made must come from the EU, ACP-countries or 
Madagascar. Since there usually is no fabric involved in the making of knitted products the ROO 
become less costly to meet in that case.94 That Madagascar exports more knitted products to the 
EU than to the US can hence be an effect of the different ROO because it is more costly to 
produce non-knitted products for the EU than for the US. 
 
A look at the top five exported clothing goods to the EU in 1994, 2000 and 2006 in Table 5.2 
also shows a different composition of the most important clothing categories in comparison to 
the US case. Clothing accessories of textile fabrics, not knitted or crocheted (8471) was the most 
exported good to the EU in 1994 while Jerseys, pullovers, slipovers, cardigans, etc. knitted or 
crocheted (8451) was the most exported good in both 2000 and 2006. Interestingly, the 
difference in export value between the most exported good and the others is a lot larger than in 
the US case. The exports to the EU market thus seem less diversified.  
 
Table 5.2 - Most exported clothing categories to the EU in USD million 
  
1994 2000 2006 
8451 Jerseys, pullovers, slip-overs, cardigans, etc. knitted or 
crocheted 
22.57 107.07 161.96 
 
of wool or fine animal hair 87% 73% n.a. 
 
of cotton 10% 20% 15% 
8439 Women's, girls' and infants' other outer garments of 
textile fabrics, not knitted or crocheted 
7.84 21.58 22.58 
 
of cotton 83% 88,5% 72% 
 
of man-made fibers 15% 9% 14% 
8471 Clothing accessories of textile fabrics, not knitted or 
crocheted 
23.43 16.91 21.73 
 
of cotton n.a. n.a. n.a. 
8423 Men's and boys' trousers, breeches and the like 7.60 27.12 17.25 
 
of cotton 97% 98% 98% 
8462 Undergarments, knitted or crocheted 10.02 24.49 15.31 
 
of cotton 100% 100% 100% 
Source: COMTRADE 
 
Inputs for exports to the EU market also differ from the inputs used for exports to the US. Cotton 
is again the most important input but wool or fine animal hair is also of great importance which 
can be related to the fact that knitted products are more important for the EU market. 
Unfortunately there is no available data for how much of category 8451 is produced of wool or 
fine animal hair in 2006 but figures for 1994 and 2000 make one believe that this input is still 
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highly important in 2006, especially when the expansion of the category 8451 is kept in mind. 
Moreover, the most exported goods to the EU do not use any synthetic fibers or other fibers 
which were relatively important inputs for exports to the US. Exports to the EU consequently 
seem less diversified also when it comes to the inputs used. 
 
These first results are related to ROO. The expansion of clothing exports to the US was for 
example a lot faster than the expansion to the EU. This could be a result of the more liberal 
AGOA ROO that allow 3rd country fabric. The investigation of exported products to the US and 
the EU also seems to suggest that liberal ROO make it easier to diversify, possibly due to the fact 
that input sourcing is less restricted. The finding that goods produced for the US use more 
synthetic and other fibers seems to support this theory as well.  
 
5.3 Textile Inputs 
The second step of the analysis deals with the composition and origin of inputs. Has AGOA with 
its liberal ROO meant more import of textile yarn and fabrics? If so, where are the inputs 
sourced from? Theory would predict that more liberal ROO would lead to imports from more 
efficient low-cost producers. In this case it would mean increased imports from Asia where the 
most productive textile producers are located. It is further interesting to see if inputs are sourced 
from producers in the EU or US which can be a sign of a ROO effect. Lastly, input origin can 
also give an indication of how successful vertical integration has been. This can answer whether 
it is justifiable to use strict ROO as a tool for development policy. 
 
Imports of textile yarn and fabrics have increased with the expansion of exports of clothing.  
Figure 5.4 below shows the composition of textile inputs from 1990 to 2006.  The most imported 
textile good has been Textile yarn (651), followed by Cotton fabrics woven (652) and Knitted or 
crocheted fabrics (655). Another observation is that Textile fabrics woven other than cotton or 
man-made fibers (654) that was the most imported textile good in the middle of the 1990s, today 
accounts for a relatively small percentage of total imports. AGOA seems to have benefited other 
products instead. Examples of such products are Tulle lace embroidery ribbons trimmings and 
other small wares (656) as well as Special textile fabrics and related products (657). In general 
more different kinds of products are imported after the entry into force of AGOA than in the 
 42 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
659 Floor coverings etc 
658 Made-up articles wholly or chiefly of textile materials nes 
657 Special textile fabrics and related products 
656 Tulle lace embroidery ribbons trimmings and other small wares 
655 Knitted or crocheted fabrics (including tubular etc fabrics) 
654 Textile fabrics woven other than cotton or man-made fibres 
653 Fabrics woven of man-made fibres (not narrow or special fabrics) 
652 Cotton fabrics woven (not including narrow or special fabrics) 
651 Textile yarn 
1990s. Moreover, imports of textile yarn and fabrics still show a positive trend. The growth rate 
of imports is slower than in the middle of the 1990s but Madagascar has never imported as much 
textile as in 2006, the last year with available data. 
 
Figure 5.4 - Total import of textile yarn and fabrics 1990-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: COMTRADE 
 
The most imported product in Figure 5.4, Textile yarn (651), consists of different kinds of yarn. 
The most imported kind of textile yarn since 1990 is Yarn of wool of animal hair (6512). In 
2006, this sub-category accounted for 87% of textile yarn imports.95 The second most imported 
yarn is Cotton yarn (6513) followed by Yarn 85% of synthetic fibers (6514). The imports of 
synthetic yarn have become increasingly important since the year 2000 which coincides with the 
increased exports of products of synthetic fibers to the US. For a complete picture of the 
composition of category 651, see Figure A.1 in Appendix.  
 
5.3.1 Origin of Imported Inputs 
To be able to relate the use of inputs to ROO, the origin of inputs must also be examined. Figure 
5.5 below shows imports of textile yarn and fabrics by origin. In the beginning of the 1990s 
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inputs were mainly sourced from the EU and Africa which can be expected from the cumulation 
rules of the Lomé/Cotonou ROO and the fact that exports to the EU took off in the beginning of 
the 1990s. Imports from the US are virtually non-existent during the whole examined period. 
AGOA has hence not benefited American textile producers. The main beneficiaries in relation to 
AGOA and input sourcing are instead Asian producers. From having been responsible for only a 
small share of total textile inputs in the early 1990s Asian producers now dominate the input 
market. Other producers have also gained slightly from the entry into force of AGOA. The 3rd 
country fabric rule consequently seems to be widely used among Malagasy clothing producers 
and one of the main explanations why exports to the US have been so successful. 
 
Figure 5.5 - Total import of textile yarn and fabrics 1990-2006 by origin  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 - Textile yarn and fabric imports from Africa 1990-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USD million 
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Source: COMTRADE 
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Figure 5.7 - Textile yarn and fabric imports from the EU 1990-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: COMTRADE 
 
Figure 5.8 - Textile yarn and fabric imports from Asia 1990-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking more closely at the types of textile inputs sourced from Africa, the EU and Asia, certain 
patterns can be revealed. Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 show textile yarn and fabric imports from 
Africa, the EU and Asia respectively broken down at a 3 digit level. Note the different scales of 
the figures. The y axis of Figure 5.8 for Asia goes up to USD 250 million while the y axis of 
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 only reach USD 70 million and USD 60 million respectively. Also, see 
Figure 5.4 if more explanation of textile categories 651-659 is wanted. 
 
Imports of African inputs took off in the early 1990s and show a positive trend until the crisis 
year of 2002, as can be seen in Figure 5.6. This result can be related to the Lomé/Cotonou ROO 
USD million 
USD million 
Source: COMTRADE 
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that demand inputs to be sourced from the EU, domestically or another African ACP-country.96 
Input sourcing from Africa would hence be allowed for products destined for the EU market. 
African inputs were also most important in the 1990s during the expansion of EU exports. As 
clothing exports to the EU later stagnated in the late 1990s, so did imports from Africa. As 
mentioned, the crisis year of 2002 marks a shift when it comes to African inputs. First of all, 
imports from Africa have never completely recovered from the crisis. Second, the composition 
of imports changed. African textile inputs were dominated by three products until 2001: Textile 
yarn (651), Cotton fabrics woven (652) and Knitted or crocheted fabrics (655). Since 2002, 
imports have become more diversified and in particular category Fabrics woven of man-made 
fibers (653) has become more important. That imports from Africa never recovered from the 
crisis can be due to the fact that several Mauritian companies left Madagascar during 2002 and  
never returned. The political instability was considered to be too damaging for business.97 The 
increased diversification of imports can have been affected by the leaving of some Mauritian 
companies but it could also be an effect of AGOA. As already has been established, exports 
designated for the US use more and more of other fibers than cotton and wool. 
 
Even if input imports from Africa have experienced a decrease in importance since 2002, the 
strict Lomé/Cotonou ROO seem to have benefited African LDC producers and increased South-
South trade which would be positive from a development perspective. A closer look reveals that 
Mauritius, that has outsourced much of its clothing production to Madagascar, accounts for at 
least 98% of imports from Africa from 1990 to 2003. From 2004 to 2006, Mauritius’ share is 
down to about 94% because of an increase of textile imports from South Africa.98 This further 
highlights the importance of the leaving of Mauritian companies in 2002. The leading position of 
Mauritius puts Madagascar’s African input sourcing in a slightly different light but the increased 
input trade between Madagascar and Mauritius is nonetheless an example of South-South trade 
that has been positively affected by the Lomé/Cotonou ROO.  
 
Imports of EU inputs show a somewhat similar pattern to the import of African inputs which 
again can be related to the strict cumulation rules of the Lomé/Cotonou ROO and to the fact that 
clothing exports to the EU started in the beginning of the 1990s. Close historical ties between 
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Madagascar and Europe and the early French investments in the Malagasy T&C sector can also 
explain the input imports from the EU. Imports of inputs from the EU showed signs of stagnation 
as early as in the mid-1990s and import volumes of European textile have actually decreased by 
about 20% since 1998. This is in turn a reflection of the relative stagnation of clothing exports to 
the EU market. Moreover, the entry into force of AGOA has not benefited European textile 
producers. This was an expected result since imports from the EU are relatively expensive so if 
you can source inputs from anywhere in the world, it is rather unlikely that EU inputs would be 
chosen.  
 
Textile imports from the EU have a different composition to the African or the Asian inputs. By 
far the most imported textile good from the EU since 1993 has been Textile fabrics woven other 
than cotton or man-made fibers (654), a product that is basically not imported from Africa at all. 
That fabric and not yarn is the most imported good from the EU is not that surprising when the 
strict ROO for non-knitted products are kept in mind. Further, there is no substantial change in 
the composition of imports since the middle of the 1990s. This is not surprising since the 
composition of exports to the EU also has remained about the same.  
 
Finally, as Figure 5.8 shows, textile imports from Asia did not really take off until the end of the 
1990s which as mentioned above can be related to the entry into force of AGOA. That many 
producers focused on the American market are financed by Asian investors should also have 
simplified the sourcing of inputs from Asia.99 In comparison to imports from Africa and the EU, 
imports from Asia recovered very quickly from the crisis in 2002 which can be related to the fast 
recovery of exports to the US. Imports from Asia are also still increasing even if exports to the 
US have decreased after 2004. The composition of imports is to some extent similar to that of 
imports from Africa, but Textile yarn (651) is a more important good among imports from Asia 
than among those from Africa. Tulle lace embroidery ribbons trimmings and other small wares 
(656) are on the other hand a less important category than for imports from both Africa and the 
EU. 
 
The Asian inputs are foremost sourced from China but India, Singapore and Pakistan are other 
countries that have contributed to the increase of Asian inputs in Malagasy clothing 
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production.100 Input sourcing from Asia is dominated by a single country to almost the same 
degree as input sourcing from Africa was dominated by Mauritius but the volumes of inputs 
sourced from Asia are much larger than volumes from Africa. AGOA ROO must therefore be 
considered to be more favorable for South-South trade than Lomé/Cotonou ROO and above all 
less trade distorting since Chinese textile producers are known to be the most efficient at the 
moment.101 
 
5.3.2 Domestic Inputs 
To asses the success of vertical integration in the Malagasy T&C sector, an examination of 
domestic input supplies is needed in addition to the above analysis of imported inputs. The 
previous section showed that imports of textile fabrics and yarn have increased substantially 
which seems to suggest that the degree of vertical integration in Madagascar has been low. If this 
is the case, using strict ROO as a tool for development policy has not been a successful strategy.  
 
Over 80% of the raw materials used in garment production are today imported. There are simply 
not enough domestic supplies available in terms of both quantity and quality.102 Certain fabrics 
used in clothing production do not have any domestic producers at all. The main input that can 
be sourced domestically is cotton but the share of domestic cotton used in clothing production 
has decreased since the middle of the 1990s. In 1993 only 34% of the Malagasy cotton demand 
was imported. As the garment sector grew, cotton fabric production did not, due to the closure of 
several textile mills. This was in turn an effect of the falling cotton production which above all 
depended on falling cotton prices but also on harder growing conditions.103 The lowest level of 
international cotton prices coincided with the crisis year of 2002 which put many cotton 
producers out of business.104 The Malagasy cotton industry is today more or less destroyed and it 
is hard to see that it will recover in the near future. This is considered to be a great loss for the 
country since many jobs could have been created in the countryside.105  
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This confirms the suspicions of a low degree of vertical integration. Not only has it not been 
successful, the situation has even gotten worse. In conclusion, the Lomé/Cotonou ROO have 
hardly contributed to an increase of usage of domestic inputs. There has consequently not been 
any form of infant industry protection through the ROO either. This result supports the critique 
of using ROO as a tool for development policy. Creating vertical integration in a competitive 
sector such as T&C where low-cost inputs are essential to stay competitive is hence very difficult 
in a developing country. A representative for a private sector organization further stated that 
forced vertical integration does not work in Madagascar; the country is too small and the global 
T&C industry is too fragmentized. Development of the cotton industry must thus be demand 
driven which means that first you create a cut and sew industry and when this is working 
properly people interested in making a profit will come and invest in spinning and weaving on 
their own.106   
 
5.4 Utilization Rates 
Another way to investigate the impact of preferential trading arrangements and the impact of 
their ROO is to look at utilization rates. Utilizations rates show exports under a preferential 
trading arrangement as shares of total export to the country in question. Studies have previously 
shown that a high value of preferences offered increases the probability that preferences are 
requested. It has been found that the difference between preferential and 3rd country tariff rates 
must be at least 4% in order for traders to have incentives for requesting preferences. If the 
difference between tariff rates is lower than that, the costs of obtaining preferences are expected 
to be higher than the gains from getting preferential access. The majority of the costs are found 
in cost of documentation and administration of ROO. ACP countries like Madagascar are 
expected to face higher costs due to among other things information disadvantages and 
institutional difficulties.107 
 
AGOA has, as seen above, had a large impact on the Malagasy T&C sector. The success            
of AGOA has been related to liberal ROO. This leads to an assumption of high utilization     
rates for AGOA apparel. Table 5.4 confirms this assumption by showing that the utilization rates 
for AGOA apparel are very high. The high utilization rates prove that the AGOA regulations are 
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not too costly to comply with for clothing producers. The liberal ROO have probably contributed 
to this result. Low utilization rates would on the other hand mean that the procedures for getting 
preferential access are too complex and costly which in turn would make producers export as 3rd 
country producers instead. Another connection to ROO is that the 3rd country fabric rule for 
AGOA apparel is heavily used, as much as 99% of all AGOA apparel uses 3rd country fabric. 
The liberal ROO that allow 3rd country fabric for LDCs have consequently been a prerequisite 
for the AGOA success. 
 
Table 5.3 - Utilization rates for AGOA and Lomé/Cotonou apparel 2002-2007 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Utilization rate for AGOA apparel 84% 95% 97% 99% 96% 97% 
Proportion using 3rd country fabric of 
AGOA apparel 
91% 92% 95% 99% 99% 99% 
Utilization rate for Lomé/Cotonou apparel 85% 82% 82% 81% 81% 88% 
Source: agoa.info, Eurostat and author’s calculations 
 
Utilization rates for Lomé/Cotonou apparel are overall lower than the utilization rates for 
AGOA. The only exception is 2002 but this crisis year, as has already been mentioned, cannot be 
seen as representative for clothing exports in general. Other years, utilization rates for 
Lomé/Cotonou are more than 10 percentage points lower than those for AGOA. Input 
restrictions in the Lomé/Cotonou ROO make exporting to the EU more costly than exporting to 
the US. Producers consequently choose to export as 3rd country producers to a larger extent for 
exports going to the EU market than for exports going to the US market. It should also be kept in 
mind that the MFN tariff for clothing in the EU ranges between 6.5%-12%. The most imported 
items, Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waistcoats and similar articles, knitted or crocheted face 
for example a 12% import tariff.108 The minimum 4% difference between preferential and 3rd 
country import tariff rates is therefore met since apparel under Lomé/Cotonou enters the EU duty 
free. That still almost 20% of Malagasy apparel exports to the EU were exported without using 
the possibility of preferential access from 2003 to 2006 is a sign of the high costs of the 
Lomé/Cotonou regulations and then in particular the high costs of the ROO. 
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 6    Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
Textile and clothing often offers an opportunity for developing countries to diversify into 
manufactured products. Madagascar is one of several African countries that have lately become 
successful clothing exporters to the EU and the US. Part of the success is due to preferential 
access to the EU and US markets. The preferential trading arrangements of the EU, 
Lomé/Cotonou, and the US, AGOA, differ however when it comes to ROO for clothing. AGOA 
has very liberal rules for input-sourcing and allows Madagascar to source inputs from anywhere 
in the world (3rd country fabric rule). The ROO of Lomé/Cotonou are on the other hand stricter 
and demand that inputs must be sourced domestically, from Africa or from the EU. This study 
has tried to analyze the impact of these different ROO on the Malagasy textile and clothing 
industry by looking at export and import patterns as well as utilization rates. 
 
Several conclusions are drawn from the study. First, clothing exports to the EU tend to be less 
diversified and contain more knitted products than exports to the US. Second, products destined 
for the US market are made of more diversified inputs than those destined for the EU market. 
The inputs used for exports to the EU are for example mainly cotton and wool while products for 
the US market, in addition to cotton and wool, also are made of man made and synthetic fibers. 
Third, exports to the US have grown more rapidly than exports to the EU after the entering into 
force of AGOA with its liberal ROO in 2000. Fourth, imports of textile fabric and yarn from 
Asia have increased dramatically since the year 2000. When the Malagasy T&C sector mainly 
exported to the EU, i.e. before 2000, inputs were only sourced from Asia to a limited extent.  The 
majority of inputs were instead sourced from Africa or the EU. This is consistent with the 
theory’s predictions. The ROO of Lomé/Cotonou limited Madagascar’s input sourcing 
possibilities which led to supply-switching towards European and African producers due to strict 
cumulation rules.  When the more liberal ROO of AGOA were introduced inputs were instead 
sourced from the most efficient producer on the world market, Asia. The possibility to source 
inputs from Asia to competitive prices made it easier to expand and to get materials that 
otherwise would have been too expensive or simply not available.  
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A few additional conclusions were also drawn. AGOA’s ROO were found to promote South-
South trade to a larger extent and to be less trade distorting than the Lomé/Cotonou ROO. 
Economic inefficiencies are avoided through AGOA since inputs are allowed to be sourced from 
the cheapest and most efficient producer on the world market. Moreover, utilization rates for 
AGOA have been higher than the utilization rates for Lomé/Cotonou indicating that the ROO in 
Lomé/Cotonou are perceived as complicated and costly. The 3rd country fabric rule is also 
heavily used for products exported under AGOA which even further underlines the importance 
of flexible input sourcing rules for expansion possibilities. Finally, no signs of increased vertical 
integration were found. The usage of domestic inputs has instead decreased substantially and the 
domestic cotton industry has almost been destroyed.  To use strict ROO as a tool for 
development policy in the T&C sector hence does not seem to have been effective in 
Madagascar. 
 
The future of the Malagasy T&C sector is uncertain. Recent events in Madagascar and 
international trade can highly affect the sector’s future, both positively and negatively. The 
liberal ROO in the IEPA have created new incentives for European investments and are expected 
to increase exports to the EU. One manager stated for example that her company already had 
gotten new clients thanks to the new ROO and that exporting to the EU now was much easier.109 
It is still too early to see any statistical effects of the IEPA but it is a possible future research 
topic. Further, South Africa has thanks to SADC become more and more interested in Malagasy 
clothing products. Exports to South Africa are therefore also expected to increase.  
 
There are nonetheless obstacles that can hinder a prosperous future of the T&C sector. Current 
weaknesses are for example the high cost of energy, the long distance to the world markets and 
the poor domestic infrastructure. The main problem is however political instability. The current 
Malagasy political crisis has had a high price for the T&C sector. Firms have gone out of 
business due to lost contracts and companies have even been burnt down during riots.110 As if 
this was not enough, the major threat to the industry right now is that Madagascar risks losing its 
AGOA eligibility in January 2010. Since AGOA eligibility requirements include the rule of law 
and political pluralism, the recent Malagasy coup d’état is not accepted by the Obama 
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administration. If free elections are not held before the end of the year AGOA eligibility will 
therefore most probably be lost. That would mean the end of Malagasy clothing exports to the 
US and possibly the beginning of the end of the entire T&C sector. Up to 100 000 jobs are 
expected to be lost indirectly if AGOA eligibility is lost and American clients are not expected to 
return because of the expiration of AGOA’s 3rd country fabric rule in 2012.111  
 
The possibility to draw any general conclusions from the results of a case study is limited. What 
nonetheless can be established is that, in the case of Madagascar, ROO have had the power to 
affect both clothing exports and textile input imports. The 3rd country fabric rule of AGOA has 
led to a considerable expansion of the Malagasy T&C sector and diversification both in terms of 
final goods produced and inputs used.  Consequently, liberal ROO have helped to create 
thousands of needed formal jobs in Madagascar and thereby promoted development.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1 – Clothing exports of African and Asian producers in million USD after the MFA phase-out 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006/2004 
(%) 
Mauritius            
Total  896 865 712 721 -16,6 
EU 627 638 555 602  
USA 269 227 167 119  
      
Madagascar           
Total 347 520 506 526 1,2 
EU  151 197 229 288  
USA  196 323 277 238  
      
Lesotho            
Total  394 457 392 388 -15,1 
EU  1 1 1 1  
USA  393 456 391 387  
      
Kenya            
Total  192 280 278 265 -5,4 
EU  4 3 7 1  
USA  188 277 271 264  
      
China            
Total  13 970 18 288 45 365 49 981 173,3 
EU   12 361 13 730 22 960 22 974  
USA 11 609 14 558 22 405 27 067  
      
Vietnam            
Total  3 115 3 478 3 793 4 611 33 
EU   631 758 912 1 215  
USA 2 484 2 720 2 881 3 396  
      
Cambodia            
Total  1 726 2 085 2 319 2 841 36 
EU 475 643 592 690  
USA  1 251 1 442 1 727 2 151  
Source: Adopted from Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2007) p. 8 
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6519 Yarn of textile fibres, nes
6518 Yarn of regenerated fibres, put up for retail sale
6517 Yarn of regenerated fibres, not for retail, monofil, strip, etc
6516 Yarn containing less than 85% of discontinuous synthetic fibres
6515 Yarn containing 85% or more of synthetic fibres, put up for retail
6514 Yarn 85% of synthetic fibres, not for retail; monofil, strip, etc
6513 Cotton yarn
6512 Yarn of wool or animal hair (including wool tops)
6511 Silk yarn and spun from noil or waste; silkworm gut
Figure A.1 – Composition of Malagasy import of textile yarn 1990-2006 
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